University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2006

Institutions, History, and Economic Development
Kenneth W. Dam
Kenneth.Dam@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenneth W. Dam, "Institutions, History, and Economic Development" (John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 271, 2006).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 271
(2D SERIES)

Institutions, History and Economic Development

Kenneth W. Dam

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
January 2006
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=875026

INSTITUTIONS, HISTORY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Kenneth W. Damα
Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American and Foreign Law
and
Senior Lecturer
The University of Chicago Law School
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

If one wants insight into how the developing world can attain the Rule of Law,
one good place to start would be to ask how countries in today’s developed world did it.
Though the developed world now stretches well beyond the countries of Western Europe
where the Rule of Law first arose, developed countries such as the United States, Canada
and Australia—and in a less direct fashion, Japan—were blessed with a successful
transplant of Western European legal institutions. Perhaps the Western European
experience can provide insights into how this process of legal institutional development
can succeed in developing countries where the transplant remedy is obstructed by
historical, societal, or other differences from Western European nations. Western Europe,
after all, was not blessed with a Rule of Law in the Middle Ages but successfully
achieved it over a number of centuries.
The first step in this analysis is to recognize that Rule of Law institutions are not
essential for economic activity (though they are relevant to economic growth). In every
country goods and services are exchanged, usually against money. In fact, in some of the
poorest countries, the level of economic activity in local marketplaces is intense, truly
something to be marveled at. And yet this exchange takes place without law playing a
significant role.
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Let us consider the public market, or bazaar, the primary economic institution of
the medieval world and even today a common sight in the developing world. After verbal
agreement between seller and buyer is reached, the seller hands over the goods and the
buyer hands over the money. The quid and the quo are exchanged simultaneously. But, as
Greif put it, suppose the quid and the quo are separated.1 They can be separated in time,
as when the buyer promises to pay later but wants to take the goods with him. What will
then give the seller confidence that he will be paid as promised? In the absence of law
(or, as we shall see, some ongoing relationship between seller and buyer), the seller is
likely to simply refuse to sell except against money pressed into his hand. The same
problem arises where goods are to be made to order with the seller requiring advance
payment.
These problems were compounded in the medieval world when the buyer and the
seller were geographically separated. True, seller and buyer could negotiate in writing or
through a traveling agent. But the separation in place meant that the goods would have to
be produced and delivered before payment could be expected, the seller thereby taking
what he might well consider an unreasonable risk that the buyer would change his mind.
Or payment could be made before the goods were produced, in which case it is the buyer
who took the risk.
In these cases, the quid and the quo were separated in both space and time. Of
course, most goods were simply taken physically to distant bazaars where they were
offered for sale. The problem for the seller in that situation was twofold. If he was
cheated in the bazaar, he had to trust the local authorities to protect him and not to
discriminate against him as a foreigner. And second he would normally have to choose
some kind of agent to act for him. If the agent absconded with his goods or with the
payment received in exchange, the producer’s remedies might be limited.
These kinds of problems were acute in the Middle Ages, not so much within the
city states that were the dominant economies of the time in Europe but whenever long
distance trade had to be carried on.2 The city states had domestic legal systems3, but they
could not easily enforce contracts in which their citizens were cheated when selling or
buying goods in distant city states. And so inter-city trade was limited. These kinds of
problems extended beyond trade and its financing to purely financial contracts and
insurance contracts, both of which necessarily had the same separation between the quid
and the quo as the trade examples.
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Even where the parties were bargaining in good faith, the separation of the quid
and the quo created the possibility that one party, however well-intentioned ex ante,
would find it to his advantage ex post to reopen the bargaining or simply welsh on the
deal. This incentive to renegotiate agreements after one party had performed, a common
occurrence even today, can be referred to as ex post opportunism; it creates severe
economic inefficiencies whenever an adequate legal system is not in place. In other
words, the enforcement of contracts is important to assure that contracts will be
performed voluntarily.
As we will see throughout this book, these kinds of problems exist across the
entire spectrum of economic activities whenever a system of law is not in place or does
not work effectively to give parties confidence that contracts will be carried out. This is
the essence of the Rule of Law problem in many developing countries where the legal
system does not, for whatever reason, work effectively.
Nevertheless, some trade can take place even though the quid and quo are
separated if the party at risk has confidence in the performance of the other party. That
confidence may come from the reputation of the other party, though that statement begs
the question of how the requisite reputation can be created. Of course, if the parties have
repeated transactions, confidence may be created because each party knows that a failure
to perform will end the business opportunities between the two. (Readers familiar with
the theory of games will recognize the repeated game phenomenon, which offsets the
incentive for someone in a two-player game to defect.4) Similarly, if the parties have
some other relationship, such as being members of the same family, that relationship may
be sufficient to give the requisite confidence. Consider the success of the extended
Chinese families spread across Southeast Asia in carrying on trade even across countries
that did not yet enjoy the Rule of Law.5
Early European Substitutes for the Rule of Law: Boycotts and Reputation
In considering the evolution of long-distance trade in Europe in the Middle Ages,
one must recognize, however, that even in that period some solutions had been found to
these kinds of problems, at least in certain instances. The solutions, however, illustrate
why a Rule of law is essential to the efficient functioning of a modern economy.
One early solution was the Community Responsibility System.6 Under this system
4
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city states (communities) would hold all members of a foreign community responsible
when any member of that foreign community cheated, or failed to pay a debt to, a local
citizen. If the foreigner refused compensation, goods of that foreigner’s compatriots
within the local community would simply be impounded for the benefit of the local
citizen. In effect, the presence of a debtor’s compatriots provided de facto collateral. The
System worked because the debtor’s community would be motivated, in view of its
dependence on long distance trade, to force its own citizen-debtor to pay because trade
opportunities would otherwise be limited by what amounted to a boycott by the creditor’s
community. The System worked for both trade in goods and for financial transactions.
The System was, however, imperfect. In a sense the sanction was too powerful. In
the first place, impoundment of goods of all foreigners from a given city disrupted trade
between the two cities, at least until the dispute was settled. Nearby city states therefore
sometimes entered into treaties to regulate the implementation of the System, as in the
Pisa-Florence Treaty of 1214.7 And the sanction was too strong in a further sense; it gave
the local creditor less reason to investigate the creditworthiness of his counterpart foreign
debtor before entering into the transaction.
Clearly third-party enforcement would have been preferable to the Community
Responsibility System. But there was no appropriate third party available where the two
communities were not subject to a common sovereign. Neither Italy nor Germany had a
single ruler because they were not unified states. In England under the Normans a
centralized legal system was created in Westminster covering the part of England subject
to royal control through traveling judges, but it was a costly and uncertain form of thirdparty enforcement, and so the Community Responsibility System played a role in
England as well.8
An effort was made in England to create an alternative adjudication system. The
Statute of Westminster I of 1275 outlawed the Community Responsibility System among
communities within England by declaring that “no stranger who is of this kingdom is to
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be distrained … for what he is neither debtor nor pledge for.”9 As a substitute, a
voluntary registration system was established eight years later in which debtor and
creditor could jointly register a debt, thereby allowing designated local officials to
foreclose on the moveable property of the debtor in the case of nonpayment.10 This
registration system was in effect a primitive mortgage or pledge system for the
enforcement of contracts involving the separation of the quid and the quo.
Another medieval solution to the problem of the separation of the quid and the
quo involved merchant guilds. In northern Europe, guilds, which already existed for other
local purposes, developed a way of dealing with the mistreatment of their members
operating outside the town of their origin. Some guilds created what amounted to a
multilateral system of boycotting foreign communities whose citizens cheated, stole from
or imprisoned guild members. This multilateral arrangement was one of the major
features of the association of German towns and merchant communities (known as the
Hansa or the Hanseatic League) surrounding the Baltic and North Seas and their tributary
rivers.11 Such a coordinated boycott was, for example, successful in forcing the Belgian
city of Bruges to deal fairly with the German expatriate business community in that
city.12
The example just cited involved boycotts, but other systems were adopted in the
period prior to the nation state that were based not on boycotts but rather on reputation.
Just as local traders within a town could rely on local knowledge and experience based
on past trading (in other words on reputation), additional means were established to build
on the reputation concept.
For example, Jewish traders, known as the Maghribi traders, operated in the area
surrounding the Mediterranean in the eleventh century. The system they developed
involved the use of foreign merchants acting as agents for merchants seeking to sell their
goods in distant towns. The problem to be solved was how the foreign agent could
acquire the reputation needed to be entrusted with the goods when ongoing
communication between principal and agent was ruled out by distance and the primitive
communications technology available to them. The level of knowledge of conditions—
prices, customs duties and the like—in the agent’s town was not just asymmetric between
principal and agent but often the principal would have no current knowledge at all.
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The solution adopted by the Maghribi traders involved a means by which the
agent could convince the principal ex ante that the agent would be honest ex post. The
Maghribi traders formed what amounted to a coalition that promoted the level of
knowledge and communication such that any cheating by an agent could be catastrophic
to the agent’s business; he could expect the knowledge of his cheating to become general
among all Maghribi traders. Maintaining a reputation for honesty could be expected to
result in favorable terms and conditions for the agent. The system worked because the
Maghribi traders were a distinct social group not just within the trading community but
within the Jewish communities of the Mediterranean world, a condition that promoted not
just trust but the communication on which trust could be based. The system was thus
built on a multilateral reputation mechanism.13
The Maghribi traders system was geographically localized in the Mediterranean
world and disappeared by the end of the eleventh century. But a different system, also
based on reputation, was being created in Northern Europe. This was the Law Merchant.
It was not a system of law enacted by a legislature or handed down by a ruler, and
therefore some scholars are reluctant to call it “law.”14 But it worked! Trading
communities, normally guilds, established their own private tribunals. The law they
adopted to govern commercial transactions was initially rooted in the rules followed in
the most developed European cities of the time, the Italian city states, and was more or
less uniform across Europe. But it was private law established and applied by private
tribunals. One can call it customary law, but it was custom of a different kind than the
customary law applied in small communities across Europe for local matters such as
inheritance.
The Law Merchant can be seen as based on reputation because it was created and
applied by merchants and was more or less uniform across northern Europe. Any word
that a Law Merchant decision had been flouted by a particular merchant would result in
the destruction of that merchant’s reputation for honesty and hence he would not be
trusted in long distance trade or credit transactions. Moreover, the fact that merchants
knew and applied this standard law meant that word of a decision could be
communicated simply and could be expected to travel quickly. Moreover, the Law
Merchant grew beyond simple sales to include credit, bills of exchange, insurance and
other trade-promoting legal devices.
A system related to the Law Merchant was used to promote honesty and fair
13
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dealing at fairs (in Champagne and elsewhere in Western Europe), which were one of the
principal means of long distance trade during this period. At these fairs buyers and sellers
met, normally once a year. A number of localities held fairs.15 We know that the fairs had
means of resolving disputes that arose at fair time, and we have some detail about the
Flanders fairs, which had their own legal system. Beginning in 1252, foreign merchants
were exempted from trial by combat and from reprisals; only their personal goods could
be confiscated, although imprisonment for debt was permitted. But the important point
was that any case involving a merchant had to be judged within a week. Cases, once
brought, could not be delayed or adjourned. In short, disputes were resolved before the
parties left the fair. It seems likely that a defendant would find it difficult to leave earlier
or, if he succeeded in leaving, ever to return in view of the power of the authorities to
exclude merchants from fairs. Moreover, many towns sent consuls to fairs to represent
their own merchants in disputes before fair courts.16 And some towns established their
own courts at distant fairs: a Flemish guild court traveled with Flemish merchants to
handle internal disputes among the Flemish merchants at fairs in England.17
The Nation State
The development of the nation state in Europe provided a means to solve long
distance trade problems. These nation states were monarchies, and the monarch had not
only the means to create courts that could coerce compliance with contracts but also
some motivation to promote trade, which meant some incentive to treat foreign traders
fairly.
With growth of nation states the problems of long distance trade began to be
resolved but only to the extent that the parties were subject to the same government.
However, even in England, which had an early start with the Norman conquest and the
centralization of the English court system in Westminster,18 it took a long period for the
legal system to evolve to support even the rudiments of what we take for granted as
necessary for a modern economy, with secured credit, business enterprises in corporate
form, and markets in shares. Moreover, the existence of a monarch with nominal
sovereignty over large areas did not mean that the writ of his judges necessarily ran so
broadly. One has only to read Shakespeare’s historical plays to realize that the rebellion
of regional nobility was a repeated occurrence and a constant preoccupation in England.
15
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In short, even with the rise of the nation state, the ability of a King’s courts to
protect long distance trade must have been largely theoretical for some centuries as
justice remained mostly local.19 For example, even in a country as relatively centralized
as France the law remained based on local custom for centuries and was not fully unified
until Napoleon. And as long as justice was local, the temptation to favor local merchants
over traders from distant parts, even merchants of the same kingdom, presented problems
for the growth of long distance trade and the development of modern financial and
insurance techniques. Flourishing foreign trade requires protection against discrimination
in the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property.
Germany and Italy did not even become unified nations until the nineteenth
century. Much as we may admire the legal systems of present day developed countries,
those legal systems have evolved a great deal. Even England, which was perhaps the first
European country to achieve geographical unity, had a number of competing court
systems. These different courts might produce different outcomes in factually similar
disputes. A prime example would be the difference between outcomes in Common Pleas,
a common law court, and Chancery, a tribunal designed to “do equity” – in short, to
provide a remedy not available at common law.20 There were, moreover, various
prerogative courts that enforced rules proclaimed by the King independent of Parliament
or the common law in the exercise of the King’s prerogative powers.21
Predation and the Rule of Law Dilemma
With the growing power of monarchs came not just court systems but also a new
threat to the Rule of Law. The monarch himself might disavow his own contracts or seize
property of a subject for his own purposes. Today we sometimes see in authoritarian
regimes in the developing world what we may call predatory rulers. And predatory is
exactly what a number of European monarchs were in earlier centuries.
Social scientists sometimes describe the resulting Rule of Law dilemma in the
following terms. A ruler strong enough to enforce contracts and protect private property
is also strong enough to take predatory action against subjects.22 If citizens cannot trust
their government to keep its hands off their property, they are unlikely to invest as much,

19

In the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries “‘pleas concerning the debt of laymen…belong[ed] to
the crown and dignity of the lord king’” and therefore were nominally within the jurisdiction of the courts,
but “‘private agreements’” were “not customarily dealt with by the king’s courts.” Ibbetson (1999, p. 17).
20
Hanbury and Maudsley (1989).
21
Berman (2003, p. 202–213).
22
Weingast (1993, p. 287).

8

at least in certain kinds of property. Investment in diamonds, jewelry and gold is still
common in the contemporary world in countries where precisely this kind of fear holds
back investment in wealth-creating property. Failure to resolve the dilemma can therefore
not just impede economic development but stimulate counterproductive behavior by
citizens of the country.
.
The first conclusion to be drawn is that to resolve this fundamental dilemma takes
time. Further, its resolution is likely to be an evolutionary process. Attempts to jump start
the process can prove dead ends. For example, one of the ways in which rulers have
sometimes tried to enrich themselves while still favoring economic development has been
to create an alliance with chosen business interests. To take an illustration, Haber and his
associates have shown that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Mexican
development took that form.23 It is fair to say that Mexico, despite its proximity to a
rapidly growing U.S. market, was held back by this coalition between autocratic rulers
and what we might today call “oligarchs.”
That today’s developed countries have largely solved not just the quid and the
quo problem but also the predatory ruler problem is not the result of the work of great
legal scholars or brilliant legal architects. On the contrary, the transition to a Rule of Law
state has in most countries been the result of an evolution over several centuries.
Legal Evolution in England
The evolution in England has been the best documented of these transitions.
Although many people of Anglo-Saxon heritage romanticize English history, often
jumping to the conclusion that the Magna Carta of 1215 created a Rule of Law state, the
facts are rather different. In truth, the Magna Carta, or Great Charter, was more a partial
settlement of a dispute between King John and the English barons.24 Schama well
captures the limited scope, yet immense promise for a future Rule of Law, of the Magna
Carta:
No one should read the Magna Carta as if it were some sort of primitive
constitution.… Inevitably, many of [its] prohibitions amounted to tax
relief for the landed and armoured classes…. So, if the Magna Carta was
not the birth certificate of freedom it was the death certificate of
despotism. It spelled out for the first time, and unequivocally … that the
law was not simply the will or the whim of the king but was an
23
24
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independent power in its own right, and that kings could be brought to
book for violating it…. All this, in turn, presupposed something hitherto
unimaginable: that there was some sort of English ‘state’ of which the
king was part (albeit the supreme part) but not the whole.25
If the Rule of Law is in part about the protection of property, it is well to recall
that Henry VIII, in seizing the monasteries, carried out one of the largest expropriations
in history, surpassed perhaps only in the twentieth century with the advent of
Communism in Russia. The monasteries, the accumulated physical manifestation of
centuries of donations by the faithful, constituted “approximately one-fourth of the
landed wealth of England.”26
The dissolution of the monasteries thus provided the Crown with vast lands,
which were gradually sold to finance the needs of the Crown and especially to finance
wars.27 Although the seizure of the monasteries was part of the struggle with Rome, the
truth is that Henry VIII, as English Kings before and after, had to run his governments
largely out of his own resources, in part because no one had enough confidence in the
King or in their legal rights against the King to lend to him. Nevertheless, the Crown did
have limited sources of public revenue. Kings successfully claimed the right to impose
customs duties as part of the royal prerogative. Taxation was limited, often to what the
King was able to coerce out of Parliament on special occasions. For example, the first
Parliament of the first Stuart King, James I (1603-1625), granted him the power to
impose additional duties on imports and exports in view of the debts run up on behalf of
the Crown by Queen Elizabeth.28
As for direct taxes, when Charles I became King in 1625, “Parliament refused to
grant the usual lifetime taxes allowed to a new monarch, and Charles resorted to forced
loans, imprisoning those who refused to give them.”29 Perhaps as a consequence, the
Stuarts expanded the practice of borrowing to finance wars, largely from goldsmiths and
non-English lenders, but they destroyed the confidence of their creditors by failing to pay
on time and sometimes by repudiating debts.
The showdown came after the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in the latter half
of the seventeenth century. At one point Charles II defaulted on the debt in the famous
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“Stop of the Exchequer” incident in order to free revenues for military purposes.30 Stuart
King James II desperately sought funding for the war against France but could not raise
adequate funds. The resulting concatenation of decisive events that led to an alliance of
convenience between Tories and Whigs to replace James II with the Dutch Prince of
Orange (who became King William III) and his English wife Mary. These events had a
series of legal byproducts that created the foundation for a Rule of Law in England.31
These fundamental changes are today called the Glorious Revolution, not just because
they were essentially bloodless but also because they created a constitutional foundation
for assuring that the English monarchy was no longer in a position to be predatory.32
Today social scientists refer to these changes as creating a “credible commitment” that
English rulers would no longer take their subjects’ property without compensation nor
repudiate their debts.33
Among these changes were that the King could only spend from public funds
what Parliament appropriated for that purpose. Some of the key steps in creating this new
order were enacted by the Convention Parliament in the 1689 Bill of Rights. This famous
document declared that “levying money for or to the use of the crown … without grant of
parliament … is illegal,” thereby giving the legislature exclusive fiscal powers.34 The
King was now truly “King in Parliament,” not King separate from and in effect over
Parliament.35 The Parliament responded by voting an annual appropriation for the
Crown.36 By the end of William’s reign in 1702, the annual “civil list” appropriation
specified in some detail what the money would be spent for.37 When the Bank of England
was created in 1694 (before it was given monetary regulatory duties as a central bank), it
was intended to be an intermediary from whom the Crown might borrow, but it was
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specifically forbidden to lend to the Crown without consent of Parliament, thereby giving
Parliament further leverage over the King.38
Parliament also established the supremacy of its lawmaking, again in the Bill of
Rights, by declaring illegal the “pretended power of suspending laws, or the execution of
laws, by regal authority, without the consent of Parliament.”39 A second almost parallel
clause similarly made illegal “dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal
authority.” “Dispensing” referred to the King’s prior practice of declaring certain statutes
inapplicable to specified individuals whereas “suspending” referred to the declaration of
statutes as inapplicable to all persons. 40 That this was not a unilateral statement by
Parliament, but rather part of the bargain between the two political parties of the day, the
Whigs and the Tories, and a bargain by them with the Crown is shown by an amendment
to the traditional Coronation Oath, in which William, unlike prior monarchs, swore to
govern “according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of
the same.”41 It is significant that, thereafter, “William and his successors duly refrained
from any attempt to exercise a suspending or dispensing power.”42
Parliament’s power vis-à-vis the Crown was made clearer in the 1701 Act of
Settlement, which regulated the succession to the monarchy.43 Thereafter, the monarchy
became a statutory office in the sense not just that its powers were circumscribed by
legislation but that even the person to succeed to that position would be determined,
albeit perhaps indirectly, by the legislature.44
More important still for the Rule of Law was a provision of the 1701 Act of
Settlement that further defined the separation of powers by establishing the basis for an
independent judiciary. The Act gave judges life tenure on good behavior,45 thereby
ending a pattern in which the Crown had threatened judges in key cases and dismissed
them when threats failed.46 Soon thereafter salaries of judges became fixed during their
tenure, and they could be dismissed only if convicted of a criminal offense or by “the
address of both houses” (similar to the U.S. impeachment process).47 These major steps
toward an independent judiciary supplemented earlier measures to limit or eliminate the
prerogative tribunals controlled by the Crown. The Star Chamber had been used, until
38
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abolished in 1641 during the Civil War,48 not just to escape the safeguards and
procedures of the common law courts, including the use of juries, but also to punish
violations of royal proclamations and other crimes designated by the Crown—in short,
crimes that were not created or defined by Parliament or by the common law courts.49
The abolition of the Star Chamber and several other prerogative courts did not put
an end to prerogative bodies. With the restoration of the Stuart monarch after the Civil
War, James II, in 1686, created a new prerogative commission to govern the church and
the clergy (with a view to reestablishing the dominance of the Church of Rome).50 In
response the 1689 Bill of Rights stated flatly that this latest effort to create a prerogative
court as well as a “court of commissioners for ecclesiastical causes, and all other
commissions and courts of like nature are illegal and pernicious.”51 This last provision
was implicitly acceded to by King William in the new Coronation Oath by his
acknowledgment that he must govern “according to the statutes in parliament agreed
upon, and the laws and customs of the same.”52 The suppression of the prerogative courts
was, as Weingast has observed, a major step by which “royal control over the judiciary
was abolished, creating the … ‘independent judiciary.’”53
Other steps creating a modern separation of powers were designed to give
Parliament independence from royal arbitrariness. Parliament, by the Triennial Act of
1694, now met in regular sessions, assuring that it could not be sent home for long
periods when its majority was opposed to the Crown or kept in session for long periods
when Parliamentary majorities favored the Crown.54 Though the Triennial Act set a limit
to the length of any particular Parliament and assured that the Parliament would meet at
least every three years, the previously mentioned provisions on the King’s income and
expenditures were perhaps more important because they changed the incentives so that it
was now in the King’s interest to see that a Parliament was in session at least every
year.55 Parliament now controlled both the King’s income (or at least his use thereof)
48
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and his borrowings. Though the King still had his traditional sources of income (such as
customs duties and the profits of lands he held personally), these traditional sources of
income were inadequate. He had to turn to Parliament every year to supplement them;
“Parliament, which from November 1685 until November 1689 did not meet at all, and
met in only 75 of the entire 130 years of Tudor-Stuart reign, has met every year since
1689.”56
In addressing the elements of the British evolution toward a Rule of Law it is
important to consider two aspects: the constitutional structure and the underlying
legislation that supported the growth of economic activity. The Glorious Revolution
established the constitutional basis. The evolution from the abolition of the Star Chamber
in 1641 through the Bill of Rights of 1688 and the Triennial Act of 1694 to the Act of
Settlement of 1701 created a solid legal and constitutional base for the Rule of Law. In
addition to cementing the independence of the judiciary, these developments fashioned a
new relationship between the King, as ruler, and Parliament. Certainly the discretionary
powers of the King vis-à-vis Parliament were drastically reduced: “of the discretionary
powers exercised … by the pre-Revolutionary English monarchy in relation to
legislation, only one—the ultimate power of veto—remained by 1690 [and] after 1708 it
was never resorted to again.”57
Although the new structure was focused on the relationship between King and
Parliament, one cannot say that by itself it created the kind of relationship between the
ruler and the people that one associates today with the Rule of Law. To be sure,
Parliament in some sense represented the people, and one can certainly say that
protection of Parliamentary power served to protect the people. Of course, one should not
confuse the resulting structure with “democracy” in view of the severe limitations on the
voting franchise. But the same objection can be made to the system created by the U.S.
Constitution of 1787. Both the English and U.S. systems represented a balance between
legislative and executive powers, providing an answer to the predatory ruler problem, and
a further balance achieved through an independent judiciary.58 In the case of England the
Glorious Revolution provided a strong base for later enjoyment of the fruits of the
industrial revolution and for an economic evolution that made England arguably the
wealthiest country in the world for a considerable period of time.
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Assessing the Glorious Revolution
The Glorious Revolution has been celebrated by economists largely for its role in
enabling the British Crown to borrow to finance wars. A broader and ultimately more
important perspective, however, concerns the creation of a Rule-of-Law state, which has
broader development implications.
The large volume of recent studies examining interest rates and other financial
indicators in the period after the Glorious Revolution to determine the financial effects of
the Glorious Revolution is important but somewhat beside the point. Interest rates fell,
though there is debate about how soon, how much, and for how long they fell.59 Certainly
the creation of a new international debt market in English government securities was
somewhat of a hit-and-miss affair.60 But the ability of the English sovereign to borrow
new money at all was noteworthy in view of the earlier behavior of the Stuart Kings.
Especially remarkable was the ability to borrow to the extent of increasing the debt
seventeenfold between 1688 and 1697.61 One reason was that Parliament greatly
increased taxes, thereby cementing, in the famous phrase of North and Weingast, a
“credible commitment that the Crown would not default.”62 A land tax was introduced
that raised large amounts of revenue. But the important point was that the land tax was
voted by the same landed classes that controlled Parliament, thereby signifying that
Parliament was prepared to pay for the wars that were engulfing England.63
The larger accomplishment for future centuries of these great constitutional
events surrounding the Glorious Revolution was, as already noted, the creation of a
functioning Rule of Law, the first in the world.64 And these accomplishments paid off.
English per capita GDP, already some 30-35 percent higher than French per capita GDP
in 1700, grew 35 percent in the 1700-1820 period while French per capita GDP grew
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only 25 percent.65 North gives credit to the rise of the power of Parliament that “caused
the nature of English property rights to diverge from the Continental pattern.”66
Perhaps the best way to explain the institutional advance over Continental
countries is to emphasize that the Glorious Revolution took care of the predatory ruler
problem. But in celebrating the Glorious Revolution’s achievements, we should not
overlook the fact that much of what was required to protect property against other private
parties had already been accomplished in part by the evolution of common law rules,
which dealt especially with land and inheritance. Also important was Parliamentary
legislation as well as acts of private contractual ordering by merchants enforced by the
common law. An early work by North points to such seventeenth century developments
as “the creation of the first patent law to encourage innovation; the elimination of many
of the remnants of feudal servitude, with the Statute of Tenures; the burgeoning of the
joint stock company, … [and] the development of the goldsmith into a deposit banker
issuing bank notes, discounting bills and providing interest on deposits.”67
Well before the Glorious Revolution, English property law already constrained
the English King in a way that the French and other Kings were not constrained. Under
French law the sovereign owned subsurface resources. But the English sovereign had no
such power. Nef observed that this was one factor in explaining how the industrial
revolution came earlier to England than to France:
The tendency in England during the hundred years from 1540 to 1640 was
not, as in France, for the sovereign to extend his authority over mining and
metallurgy. Under the influence of decisions in the common-law courts,
and under the pinch of financial necessity, the royal authority contracted at
a time when the rapid expansion in the output of copper, lead, iron, and
especially coal gave the mining and metallurgical industries a much
greater importance in England than in France.68
In short, the legal measures surrounding the Glorious Revolution taken together
with earlier common law decisions and Parliamentary legislation established a set of
rules protecting property rights and enforcing contracts, free from arbitrary actions of the
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Crown. These rules enabled Britain in the eighteenth century not only to enjoy faster
growth of the economy but also led the way into the Industrial Revolution.69
Constitutions
Although the Glorious Revolution is primarily to be seen as creating a
constitutional structure, it is important to observe that it did not result, as most
revolutions do today, in a single written document and certainly not one that those
involved chose to call a constitution. Constitutions did not become fashionable until the
U.S. Constitution nearly a century later. (And, of course, the British Constitution even to
this day is not a single written document.)
Relations between the government and the people are now often thought of as a
matter for constitutions. For that reason constitutional development is essential not just
for the protection of human rights but rather also, as the English example shows, for
economic development. That is one of the shortcomings of the Legal Origins literature,
which focuses on only one side of the economic development question—the private law
side—and pays less attention to the public law side. Public law concerns not just
constitutions—where the influence of the U.S. Constitution with its separation of powers
is an important if often overlooked element in nineteenth century economic
development—but also the way in which the public bureaucracy is controlled, if at all, by
an independent judiciary.
Constitutions can, of course, have a major impact on the Rule of Law, particularly
in the realm of personal liberties and human rights. These latter subjects are beyond the
scope of the present discussion, though certainly relevant to the protection of property
because it is hard to visualize a system that does not protect people but does adequately
protect property. Put differently, if a person’s life and personal freedom are at risk, then
that person’s physical property can hardly be safe. Nevertheless, one can observe
developing countries with rapid growth but without satisfactory human rights
protections—China being a prototypical example.
One completely different constitutional issue that has some bearing on economic
development is federalism. In some cases federalism can contribute to economic growth.
Certainly allocating some governmental power to constituent units of a country, as in the
case of the United States, acts as a constraint on abuse by the central government. And as
Weingast has pointed out, federalism can also favor economic development by
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preserving markets.70 This possibility will be explored in a discussion of federalism in
China in a later chapter. But perhaps as often, federalism creates barriers to economic
development, as the case of Russia in the 1990s suggests.71 In any event, federalism is
not essential to economic development, as the case of present-day still highly centralized
France demonstrates.
Non-Constitutional Elements of the Rule of Law
For now it is important to return to the non-constitutional aspect of the Rule of
Law, the part that is referred to when developing countries are urged to protect property
rights and enforce contracts. On its face this is a simple dictate. But it is not an easy
policy to implement. Worse still, it is a slogan, more than a directly implementable
policy. Just as in the case of the public law side involving the relation between
government and the people, achieving the property/contract Rule of Law goal in private
and commercial law has proved to be more of an evolutionary process than a simple
decision and legal drafting exercise.
One of the problems is that the apparently crystal clear injunction to protect
property and enforce contracts is inherently ambiguous. To show why this is so, it is
useful to review what the draftsmen of the French Civil Code had in mind when they set
out to begin their work. We cannot get too far with our analysis if we start with the Legal
Origins conclusion that French law falls short. After all, the French Revolution and the
Code Civil were precisely about private property and freedom of contract.
Nothing reveals so clearly that those ideas are inherently ambiguous than to
examine what the French code drafters had in mind. Indeed, what they had in mind is
some ways unrelated to the modern day Rule of Law, not just in the literature of the
Legal Origins scholars72 but also of the theorists of the Rule of Law, such as Friedrich
Hayek.
Protection of property in the Napoleonic period meant predominantly an end to
feudalism and thereby the subversion of the power of the aristocracy. The 1791 French
Constitution, although it did not survive, perfectly reflects the revolutionary intentions:
“… there is no longer nobility, nor peerage, nor hereditary distinctions, nr feudal
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regimes….”73 Feudalism in Europe meant originally a complex hierarchical system in
which an ordinary owner’s interest was dependent on the interest of a higher-level
person.74 By the time of Napoleon it meant the aristocratic practice of primogeniture,
which by assuring that only the eldest son inherited land assured the survival of landed
estates in the same families generation after generation and hence the perpetuation of the
aristocracy’s wealth and thereby its power. 75 Napoleon’s solution in the Code Civil was
to require the division of property at death among all children.76 A person with children
could dispose of only one-tenth of his property by will.77 The obvious purpose was
revolution by evolution: over several generations the great landed estates would be
divided and subdivided and the aristocracy would lose its prestige and power.
One perhaps not so minor detail is that the 1791 Constitution also stated that only
one hierarchical feature from the past would not be abolished: “…nor any other
superiority [was to be allowed] than that of public functionaries in the performance of
their functions.”78 This can be interpreted as a belief in the bureaucratic state, with an
emphasis on the public sector; that particular revolutionary heritage may be more
important historically than the Code Civil. Indeed, even without the exaltation of the
public functionary, the draftsmen’s intent to eliminate all prior law had a similar
consequence. Merryman concludes that even during the more temperate postrevolutionary days of the Civil Code, there was a sub-text that underlay the declared
purpose of writing on a clean slate:
[O]ne reason for the attempt to repeal all prior law, and thus limit the
effect of law to new legislation, was statism—the glorification of the
nation-state. A law that had its origin in an earlier time, before the creation
of the state, violated this statist ideal. So did a law that had its origin
outside the state—in a European common law, for instance.79
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Thus, if the origin of public law may be at least as important as the origin of
private law, this underlying theory of French constitutional arrangements with its
background of glorifying the nation state and the public functionary may well be more
important for economic development than anything one can actually read in the Code
Civil.
One important fact is that it took a good long time to eliminate all aspects of
feudal land ownership in the present developing world. Take Latin America as an
example: It was not just that French private law was not adopted in Latin America for
many decades after independence. In addition, even though French law may have been an
influence, the French Code Civil was rarely adopted outright. Rather Spanish law and
Roman law, perhaps more supportive of feudal ideas, played a role in Latin America. In
doing so, this cafeteria approach helped to perpetuate the societal role of the descendants
of the early Spanish and Portuguese settlers.80 When we come to modern times, we
should certainly not assume that the spirit and theory of the property changes wrought by
the French Code Civil would determine the protection accorded by Latin American
governments to newer forms of property, such as rights in intangible property or
shareholder rights.
The same counterintuitive story about protection of property can be told about the
French Revolutionary draftsmen’s intentions with regard to “freedom of contract.” What
that phrase meant in practice was that certain limitations on contracts that came largely
from the influence of the Church were invalidated. A prime example was the abolition of
usury restrictions on contracts. If there was to be freedom of contract, then legal
restrictions on the rate of interest could not be tolerated.81 But this element of French
revolutionary law was later abandoned.
A final aspect of the Code Civil bearing on the Rule of Law is that it was drafted
in the context of other changes designed to reduce the role of the judiciary to a
mechanical interpretive role in order to avoid gouvernment des juges and assure the
dominance of the legislature. The judges were simply to apply the enactments of the
legislature to the letter, just as a bureaucrat would be expected to do. Whether a judiciary
with such a limited role can assure the Rule of Law is an important question.
One can conclude that although at a superficial level, the emphasis on property
and freedom of contract might seem to be the keystones of a move toward the Rule of
Law, especially in the simple-minded modern “protect property rights” and “enforce
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contracts” version, the French Civil and Commercial Codes (and one could argue at
greater length, civil law in general) do not necessarily equate to the Rule of Law. More is
required.
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